




International interdependence and policy coordination in economies with real and
nominal wage rigidity




Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Link to publication in Tilburg University Research Portal
Citation for published version (APA):
van der Ploeg, F. (1990). International interdependence and policy coordination in economies with real and
nominal wage rigidity. (Reprint Series). CentER for Economic Research.
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
            • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
            • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
            • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.







~ u I iu u i i ii m ii ii iu uu i iu ii ii ii ui
~ C I N 0 0 9 2 0~
International Interdependence and
Policy Coordination in Economies
with Real and Nominal Wage
Rigidity
by
Frederick van der Ploeg
Reprinted from Greek Economic Review,
Vol. 10, No. 1, 1988
~,;' Reprint Series~, ~,~Q~,~,OJQ`'~ ~~j, no. 31




Frederick van der Ploeg
Board
Helmut Rester
Eric van Damme, director
Arie Kapteyn


























Université Catholique de Louvain
Tilburg University
Croningen University





Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University
Tilburg University
University oF California at Los Angeles
Stanford Uníversity
Address: Hogeschoollaan 225, P.O. Box 90153, 5000 LF. Tilburg, The Net.herlands
Phone : .31 13 663050
Telex : 52426 kub nl







Policy Coordination in Economies
with Real and Nominal Wage
Rigidity
by
Frederick van der Ploeg
Reprinted from Greek Economic Review,
Vol. 10, No. 1, 1988
Reprint Series
no. 31
INTERNATIONAL INTERDEPENDENCE AND POLICY
COORDINATION IN ECONOMIES WITH REAL
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I~y Frederick van der Plceg'
1. 1NTRODUCTION
Most of the policy debate about the performance of the OECD economies
in the eighties seems to be concerned with the relative tightness of Europe's
fiscal policy and the relative looseness of US fiscal policy. Many commenta-
tors have urged Europe to engage in a fiscal expansion and the US to engage
in a fiscal contraction (e.g., Layard et al., 1984),' but neither of the governments
on the two sides of the Atlantic have been particularly keen to implement
these recommendations. The main objectives of this paper are to understand
these suggestions for economic policy, to understand why the European go-
vernments and the US government have no apparent desire to implement
them, and in particular to understand why recovery in Europe seems so hard.
The framework that be will used is a two-country model with asymmetries in
aggregate supply, i.e., nominal wage rigidity in the US and real wage rigidity
in Europe (cf., Branson and Rotemberg, 1980), and then elementary differen-
tial game theory is used to assess the potential merits of international policy
coordination. Before these particular issues are addressed, it is useful to re-
view the assumptions underlying the standard Mundell-Fleming models and
the consequent effects of fiscal and monetary policy on output and employ-
ment.
In the traditional one-country Mundell-Fleming world with floating ex-
change rates and perfect capital mobility a monetary expansion is doubly
' Financial support from the Economic and Social Research Council, the Ford Foun-
d~tion, the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation and the Centre for Economic Policy Rescarch is
grr[cfully acknowledgcd. Thc author is grateful lo Stewart Robcrlson for the preparation of
the graphs of the main economic indicators for the seven largest OECD economies.
I."Thcre is world-wide agreement, it secros, that the prospective US long-run dcficits
rre harmful to the world economy. It is also the case, kss generally agrecd, thal European
recovcry is too slow and too prccarious. The natural corulusion is some intertcmporal trade :
more rapid European recovery through fiscal stimulus traded off for reduced long-run US
deficits" (Layard et al., 1984, p. 63).
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powerCul, because the incipient capital outflows (induced by the downward
pressure on interest rates) are choked off by a depreciation of the exchange rate
and this results in a further increase is aggregate demand. A fiscal expansion
leads to incipient capital inflows, which are choked off by an appreciation of
the exchange rate. The contraction in net exports completely crowds out the
increase in government spending, so that a fiscal expansion has no effects
on output. The Mundell-Fleming model of a small open economy assumes
fixed prices of goods and labour and only considers aggregate demand;
it also ignores expectational dynamics. A more fully specified model also
considers aggregate supply. The Mundell-Fleming model assumes nominal
wage rigidity, but the policy results are reversed when there is real wage rigi-
dity. In that case a monetary expansion has no real effects and simply leads
to a one-for-one increase in prices and wages, so that a fully indexed economy
is insulated from monetary shocks. However, a fiscal expansion leads to an
appreciation of the real exchange rate and therefore to a reduction in the
wedge between the producers' and consumers' wage. This leads to an increase
in output and employment (Casas, 1975; Argy and Salop, 1977; Sachs, 1980,
van de Klundert and van der Plceg, 1989). Hence, the qualitative conclusions
on the effectiveness of monetary and fiscal policies are not robust to the
degree of real or nominal wage rigidity. However, employers' subsidies or
cuts in employers' taxes increases output and employment in a small open
economy irrespective ofwhether nominal or real wages are rigid (Argy and
Salop, 1977). In the first case, the cut in employers' taxes reduces the price
level, increases the real money supply and therefore increases aggregate
demand. In the second case, thewedge between the producers' and consumers'
wage is reduced and therefore aggregate supply is increased.
in the twacountry Mundell-Fleming world a home monetary expansion
increases net exports of the home country, so that home output inereases and
foreign output decreases. In other words, monetary expansion is a beggar-
thy-neighbour policy. Similarly, fiscal expansion is a locomotive policy. Thc
nature of these spill-over effects depend on the assumption of nominal wage
rigidity in both countries. When both countries have real wage rigidity, mone-
tary expansion has no real effects whilst fiscal expansion is a beggar-thy-
neighbour policy (as the associated appreciation of the real exchange rate in-
creases the foreign wedge). More interestingly, when Europe has real wage
rigidity and the US has nominal wage rigidity, a European Ciscal expansion and
a US monetary expansion are locomotive policies whilst a US fiscal expansion
is, typically, a beggar-thy-neighbour policy (e.g., Argy and Salop, 1983).z This
2. Similar results for the erfectiveness of fiscat aod monetary policy in two-country
modcls with nominal and real wage rigidity arc discussed in Oudiz and Sachs (1984).
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implies that, in the absence of international policy coordination, the European
fiscal stance is too tight Crom the US point of view and too loose from tlie
European point of view whilst US fiscal policy is, typically, too loose (see
Section 6). Some German commentators might have a world with the "law of
one pricé '(purchasing power parity) in mind, because they argue that (Euro-
pean) fiscal policy has no real effects whatscever (as it cannot affect the wedge)
and thcrefore should be set at a level consistent with no inflation. Such an
asymmetric two-country model allows one, as has been pointed out by Bran-
son and Rotemberg (1980) before, to understand the recent suggestions for
international policy coordination and at the same time to understand why
recovery in Europe is so hard.
Simple differential game theory is usually used to assess the merits
of international policy coordination (see Hamada (1985) for the pioneering
work in this area). For example, Miller and Salmon (1985), Currie and Le-
vine (1985), and Oudiz and Sachs (1985) use symmetric two-country real-
exchange-rate overshooting models with nominal wage rigidity and the na-
tural rate hypothesis to investigate the gains from coordination in the transient
phase when countries are involved in monetary disinflation. Since re-
ductions in monetary growth in such models are a beggar-thy-neighbour
policy, the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium solution gives rise to excessi-
vely fast disinflation relative to the cooperative solution. These results assume
that the Central Banks can pre-commit themselves, but when they cannot
international policy coordination may be counter-productive (Rogoff, 1985;
van der Ploeg, 1988). The point is that, in the absence of coordination, a sur-
prise increase in monetary growth induces a depreciation of the exchange rate
and leads to inflation costs whilst, in the presence of coordination, such a
disincentive does not exist, hence coordination exacerbates the credibility
problems and becomes counter-productive. lt is also possible that coordination
between two countries (say, France and Germany) is counter-productive,
because it may provoke an adverse response from a third country (say the
US) (e.g., Canzoneri and Henderson, 1986). Interesting empirical work in
this area has only just started (e.g., Oudiz and Sachs, 1984; McKibbin and
Sachs, 1986). The present paper builds on this work and attempts to assess
the merits of coordination of fiscal and supply-side as well as monetary poli-
cies in two-country models with real as well as nominal wage rigidity.
7he four main objectives of this paper are :(i) to provide new empirical
evidence on real and nominal wage rigidity in the OECD economies; (ii) to
develop a convenient diagrammatic exposition that can be used for teaching
purposes to analyse the spill-over effects of fiscal, monetary and supply-side
policics in a two-country model with floating exchange rates, perfect capital
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mobility and real and~or nominal wage rigidity; (iii) to analyse, with the aid
of simple game theory, the nature of the bias in economic policies arising
from the lack of international policy coordination; and (iv) to analyse the
effects of an oil shock in a two-country model with real wage rigidity at home
and nominal wage rigidity abroad.
Section 2 examines the development of unemployment, inClation, com-
petitiveness, interest rates, monetary policy, fiscal stance and supply-side
polícies in the seven largest OECD economies during the seventies and
eighties. Section 2 also estimates annual wage equations, of the error-correction
type, Cor these economies and tests which economies have a significant degree
of nominal wage rigidity in the short run. It turns out that Canada, the UK
and the US show evidence ofnominal wage rigidity, but that France, Germany,
Italy and Japan have real wage rigidity. Section 3 then sets up an analytical
two-country model with floating exchange rates, uncovered interest parity,
imperfect substitution between home and foreign goods, and sluggish labour
markets. For each country two extreme cases ofnominal and real wage rigidity
can be considered, that is either growth in nominal wages is given by mone-
tary growth or the real consumers' wage is constant. It follows that the only
dynamics in this model then arises from the perfect-foresight dynamics of
the real exchange rate, so that for unanticipated permanent shocks the transi-
tion to the new equilibrium is instantaneous. Section 4 considers a world
with nominalwage rigidity at home and abroad, which is closest to the conven-
tional Mundell-Fleming world, and develops a convenient diagrammatic ap-
paratus to analyse the spill-over effects of various economic policies. [t is shown
that an expansion in monetary growth and a cut in taxes are beggar-thy-
ncighbour policies as they lead to a fall in the world real interest rate, an ex-
cess demand for foreign money, a downward pressure on the foreign price level,
and therefore an increase in the foreign real wage and fall in foreign output.
Fiscal expansion is a locomotive policy. Section 4 also assesses the merits of
international policy coordination with the aid of discounted social welfare
loss Cunctions that depend on output and inflation in the consumers' price
index. In the absence of international policy coordínation, optimal monetary
growth is too high and time-inconsistent. Section 5 considers a world with
real wage rigidity at home and abroad. Now monetary growth has no real
effects, fiscal expansion is a beggar-thy-neighbour policy (as the associated
appreciation of the real exchange rate increases the wedge between the foreign
producers and consumers' wage), and supply-side improvements are a loco-
motive policy (as they lead to a depreciation of the real exchange rate and
therefore to a fall in the foreign wedge). Section 5 also employs discounted
social welfare loss functions, that depend on output and the public deficit, to
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show that in the absense of coordination fiscal polícy is too loose and time-
inconsi~tent. It also contains a brief discussioa on the optimal coordination
of monetary growth rates in a world with pegged exchange rates. Section 6
considers an asymmetric world with real wage rigidity at home (Europe and
Japan) and nominal wage rigidity abroad (Canada and US). Now a European
fiscal expansion, an increase in US monetary growth and a US tax cut are
locomotive policies whilst a European tax cut and, typically, a US fiscal ex-
pansion are beggar-thy-neighbour policies. Oil price shocks typically hit
European output and employment much harder than US output and employ-
ment. It follows that, in the absence of international coordination and in the
aftermath of the OPEC oil shocks, the European fiscal stance is too tight
from the US point of view and too loose from the European point of view
whilst the US fiscal stance is, typically, too loose, and the US monetary growth
rate is too low. Section 7 concludes the paper.
II. THE MAIN OECD ECONOMIES
Il.t Economic Developments in tlie Seventies and Eigh[ies
Graph I shows the standardised unemployment rates for the economies
of the Group of Seven during the period 1970-1984. In all economies, except
the US, there has been a steady rise in the unemployment rate since 1970.
The rise in the unemployment rate has been particularly dramatic for the
European economies. For example, for the UK it has risen from 3 per cent
in 1970 to 13.2 per cent in 1985, for Italy from 5.3 per cent to 10.5 per cent,
for Germany from 0.8 per cent to 10.6 per cent and for France from 2.4 per
cent to 10.1 per cent. lt is well known that the rise in European unemployment
is mainly due to the failure to create sufficient jobs rather than due to increases
in tlie labour force or other demographic factors (e.g., Newell and Symons,
1987). The US economy seems to have adjusted much better to the OPEC
shocks of 1973 and 1979 than the othcr economies, since its unemployment
rate has riscn from 4.8 per cent in 1970 to a peak of 8.3 per cent in 1975 and
:~nother peak of 9.S per cent in 1982183 and has fallen to 7.1 per cent in 1985.
The recessíons in the US seem to be shorter and deeper than elsewhere, which
may be due to thc US adjusting employment more rapidly than the wage. In
contrast to the US economy, the Canadian economy has secn its unemployment
r:~te rise fairly steadily from S.6 per cent in 1970 to 10.4 per cent in 1985. The
Japancsc economy has very low unemployment rates and has seen a modest
increase from 1.1 per cent in 1970 to 2.6 per cent in 1985, but these figures
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GRAPH 6. Composition of the wedge between the pro-
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shows the annual percentage inflation in the deflators of consumers' expendi-
tures. Apart from Germany, the European economies have relatively high
inflation rates. For all countries there are peaks in the inflation rates around
1974 and 1980 which are related to the two OPEC shocks in oil prices, and
subsequently there are steady falls in inflation rates, which are related to the
tightening of monetary policy in the Group oC Seven during the 1980s. Graph
3 shows various interest rates. Most of the economies of the Group of Seven
have very low (even negative) realised real interest rates during the 1970s and
quite a large rise in real interest rates during the 1980s, which again is a result
of the tightening of monetary policy in the 1980s. Graph 4 shows the indices
of real competitiveness. The US (and to a lesser extent Canada) experienced a
gradual increase in the real price of imports, associatedwith an increase in raw
material prices and depreciation of the US real exchange rate, until 1980 and
subsequently a gradual fall in the real price of imports, associated with ap-
preciation of the US real exchange rate. The UK has experienced apprecia-
tion of its real exchange rate since 1974, which may be due to the advent of
North Sea oil and later on due to the Thatcher experiment. However, since
1981 this trend in the UK has been reversed. Europe as a whole has seen
a loss of competitiveness up to 1980, with a gain since then.
Graph 5 shows various government budget surpluses. Even when one
corrects for the business cycle and for inflation, the US, Canada and France
have loosened their fiscal stancewhilst Germany, Italy, the UK and especially
Japan have tightened their fiscal stance during the 1980s. Hence Europe
(ignoring the Mitterrand experiment in France) and Japan have recently
tightened their fiscal stance whilst the US and Canada have loosened their
fiscal stance. One of the main objectives of this paper is to explain these
differences in tiscal stance (see Section 6). It will be argued that a European or
Japanese fiscal expansion is a locomotive policy, so that in the absence of
coordination their fiscal expansion is too tight from the US point of view.
Howcver, a US or Canadian fiscal expansion is, typically, a beggar-thy-neigh-
bour policy and therefore their fiscal stance is, typically, too loose. This in-
sight helps to understand why during the 1980s European unemployment has
risen so much, world interest rates have risen, and the European (US) real ex-
change rate has depreciated (appreciated) (see Graphs I, 3, 4 and 5). Graph 6
shows the composition of the wedge between the producers' wage and the con-
sumers' wage. The wedge is the sum of the employers' tax rate (s~, the employ-
ees' tax rate (r~, the indirect tax rate (r~, and the share of imports in total ex-
penditures times the wedge between the import price and the output price (r,„).
The wedge is one of the indicators of supply-side policy. In most countries
the wedge has risen steadily throughout the post-war period. For the US the
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wedge has increased from 24.8 per cent in 1953 to 42.2 per cent in 1983, for
Canada from 24.7 per cent to 36.6 per cent, for France from 54.9 per
cent to 63.6 per cent, for Germany from 48.9 per cent to 55.1 per cent,
and for the UK from 34.6 per cent to 57.0 per cent. Hence, the rise in
the wedge has been particularly spectacular for the UK and the US. For
Italy the rise in the wedge has been modest. from 51.4 per cent in 1961 to
56.5 per cent in 1983. 1-he trend increase in the wedge is due to the steadily
rising burden of taxation in the OECD economies, which no doubt has
had an adverse effect on the NA1RU's of these economies. However,
fluctuations of the wedge around trend have been mainly due to fluctua-
tions in the import price wedge and the real exchange rate (also see Graph 4).
For example, during the eighties, the tightening of the European fiscal stance
and the loosening of the US fiscal stance might have contributed to the de-
preciation of the European real exchange and consequently to the increase
in the European wedge, the worsening of European supply and the increase
in the European unemployment rate (see Graphs l. 4, 5 and 6 and the dis-
cussion in Section 6).
11.2 Empirical Evidence for Real and Nominal Wage Rigidity'
It has been argued that the US economy has stickiness of nominal wages
(money iUusion) and that the European and Japanese economies have real
wage rigidity (Branson and Rotemberg, 1980; and Bruno and Sachs, 1985).
This section employs annual, time-series data for the 7 largest economies of
the OECD to test whether the above hypothesis is valid. The sample period is
1955-83, except for Italy and Japan for which it is 1962-83. The following
regression model has been estimated for each of these countries ( see Atta-
nasio, Manasse and van der Ploeg, 1987) :
Ow - ao t al~pe t(l - al)Ow-I - aYU - a34u t a~PROD
i- a5A'C - a~(w - T. - p~) i- e, (2.l)
where w, fi~, rt, u, PROD, 1VC and e denote the logarithm of the nominal wage,
thc logarithm of the consumers' price index, the employees' (direct) tax rate,
the unemployment rate (except for Japan for which it is the ratio of jobs
wantcd to jobs offered), the trend (three-year moving average) of the logarithm
3. The regression results in this Scction have been obtained by Orazio Attanasio and
are part of the London School of Economics Econometric Model of ttx Group of Seven
(Attanasio, Manassc and van der Plocg, 1987).
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of the output-employment ratio, a measure of industrial conflicts (except for
the UK for which it is an incomes policy dummy), and a white-noise error
term, respectively.
Equation (2.1) is~an error-correction mechanism (Sargan, 1964), which
ensures that;the (post-tax real) consumers' wage, w- TL - p~, always re-
turns to its long-run;equilibrium value (aa - alp - asu f a~PROD f aSNC) J
a6 (ae ~ 0) where p denotes the feasible growth in real wages ( trend growth
in labour productivity). The long-run consumers' wage increases when the
bargaining strength of workers or "wage push" increases, i.e., when unemploy-
ment falls (a2 ~ 0) and labour productivity, increases (a.~ ~ 0), and when
the firms' ability to pay, i.e., the feasible growth in real wages decreases (a3 ~0).
There may also be hysteresis effects (Blanchard and Summers, 1987), so
that changes in (rather than the levels of) the unemployment rate determine
the bargaining strength of workers (as ~ 0). One reason for hysteresis is
that the long-term unemployed do not actively seek for a job and therefore do
not exercise a downward pressure on wages. An alternative explanation
is
based on an analysis of insiders versus outsiders.
To allow for some nominal inertia in the short run, the growth in nominal
wages is assumcd to depend on a weighted average of
inflation in the consu-
mers' price index and past growth in nominal wages (0 ~ al ~ 1). When
wages are instantaneously indexed to the
consumers' price level (al - 1),
there is no nominal inertia or money illusion and
therefore one has rcal wage
rigiditi~. Wlien there are lags in the process ofwage indexation (al ~ 1),
one
has nominal wnge rigidity.' Note that the
homogeneity of (2.1) ensures that in
the long run, the growth in nominal wages is fully indexed
to inflation in the
consumers' price index and therefore in the long run real wage rigidity
always
prevails. An alternative interpretation is that core
inflation influences wage
inflation one-for-one and that coce inflation equals current
inflation in the
consumers' price index under "rational expectations" (real wage rigidity) and
is a weighted average of past rates
of inflation in the consumers' price index
under "adaptive expcctations '(nominal wage rigidíty).
However, the inter-
prctation of al as an adjustment cocfficient in the
indexation process seems
prcferable.
Table 1 prescnts the regression results for Canada (CA), France (FR)
Germany (GE), Italy (IT), Japan (JA), UK and US. All
the equations appcar,
to be well determined, the reported
diagnostics show no signs of misspecifi-
4. Whcn lags in price [ormation
are ignorcd, (a~ la~ is a rncasure of rcal wage rigidity
and (1 - al)laa is a me~suro of
nominal wage rigidity (see Grubb, lackman and Layard,
1983, but striclly spcaking these measures
are derived for theqse a~ ~~.
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TABLE 1
Econometric Estimates of Waee Equations for tlu Main OECD Econotnies
Aw CA FR GE IT ]A UK US
Constant -0.785 -0.569 -2.235 -1.310 -0.014 -0.810 -0.306
t-ratio 2.09 3.26 3.32 3.48 0.03 2.73 1.65
Ap~ 0.633 0.913 0.808 0.992 0.895 0.717 0.641
t-ratio 5.81 7.28 4.63 7.26 7.90 5.65 4.40
Ow` t 0.368 0.087 0.192 0.008 0.105 0.283 0.359
t-ratio 3.38 0.69 1.10 0.06 0.93 2.23 2.47
uD -0.444 -0.164 -1.438 -1.367 -0.083 -0.350
t-ratio 2.22 6.36 3.02 1.62 3.02 1.77 -
Au - -1.750 - - - - -0.314
t-ralio 1.83 2.90
1'[20D 0.202 0.069 0.561 0.282 0.062 0.366 0.071
t-ratio I.85 2.30 3.58 2.71 0.39 2.87 1.23
NC~ 0.0084 0.035 - 0.0391 0.0082 -0.0796 0.0113
t-ratio 2.07 4.07 2.43 0.43 3.49 1.92
w-r~-p~ -0.200 -0.073 -0.563 -0.223 -0.087 -0.338 -0.130
t-ratio 1.88 1.56 3.83 2.79 0.78 2.72 1.62
Standard 0.0094 0.0112 0.0174 0.0236 0.0145 0.0163 0.0083Error
SARGAN~ 9.97 11.23 10.54 8.23 8.37 6.79 11.41
d.f. 6 7 8 8 6 7 8
LMIe 0.27 0.11 0.03 1.07 1.14 1.16 0.49
1iETERO~ 7.26 0.09 0.01 0.16 0.14 0.45 1.29
Notcs :
a) These ccefficients have been restricted to add up to unity. The restrictionswere nol
rejected at the S per cent significance level.
b) The unemployment rate stalislics for ]A are not a vcry good mcasure of labour
market conditions (Hamada and Kurosaka, 198G), hence instcad the serics of the ralio of
jobs wantcd to jobs offcred has bcen used.
c) For CA and IT, this is the logarithm of the number of days losl through strikes
(IaggcJ). For FR, this is the logarithm of the number of conflicts. For the US, this is the
logarithm of the numbcr of conflicts (lagged). For the UK, this is an incomes policy dummy
for thc ycars 197G-77.
d) Sargan's test for scrial correlation o( 1V residuals (Brcusch and Godfrey, 1981,
:~plxndix B).
c) Tcst for residual scrial corrclation (Godfrcy, 1987)
f) Tcst for homoskcdasticity (Whitc, 1980).
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cation, and all coefficients are significant and of the right sign or insignificant
at the S per cent level. The main point to notice is that the null hypothesis
that there is real wage rigidity cannot be rejected at the 5 per cent sígnificance
level for FR, GE, IT and JA, because the coefficients on ~w-I (i.e., 1- al)
arc insignificantly different from zero. CA, the US and, to a lcsser extcnt, the
UK do have a significant degree of nominal inertia. Hence, the European
economies (apart from the UK) and the Japanese economies can be charac-
teriscd by real wage rigidity whilst the Canadian and US economies have a
significant degree of nominal wage rigidity.
III. A TWO-COUNTRY WORLD WITH FLOATING EXCHANGE
RATES AND UNCOVERED INTEREST PARITY
Consider a twacountry world with floating exchange rates, highly in-
tegrated and efficient financial markets, and sluggish labour markets. The
asset menu consists of home cash, home government bonds and foreign
government bonds. There is imperfect substitution between home and foreign
goods, but perfect substitution between home and foreign government bonds.
Firms produce goods at home and can sell either at home or abroad. The
goods and money markets clear instantaneously, but the labour market does
not clear due to rigidity of either nominal wages or of real consumers' wages.
Indexation of the wage rate to increases in the cost-of-living, arising from in-
creases in consumers' prices or taz rates, is an important feature of the Euro-
pean and Japanese economies whilst nominal wage rigidity is an important
Ceature of the US and Canadian economies (see Section 2). The government
has three policy instruments at its disposal, viz. open-market operations
(money supply), changes in public spending (fiscal shock) and various forms
oC supply-sidc policies (e.g., wage push or marginal tax rates). The residual
mode of government finance is bond issues. The analysis abstracts from
weatth effects, current-account dynamics, intertemporal government budget
constraints and commercial banking systems.
The two-country model consists of the following equations :
y--á.fácfffyy~, O~y~ 1 (3.l)
y~ -- ár~ - óc -F Í` f YY (3.2)
~ - i - Epo (3.3)
~' - i' - EP~ (3.4)
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c - p~ :- c - p (3.s)
m-p-S~Y-.li (3.6)
m" - p` - S~Y' - J.i' (3.7)
i - i' t Et (3.8)
p~ -(1 - a)p t a(p~ t e) (3.9)
pó -(1 - a)p' t a(P - t) (3.10)
Y- -~i [(w t T - p) t Q3lp: t c)l t~a (3.11)
Y' - -~i ((w' t s~ - p`) -t ~sp~ ) f ~i (3.12)
w - n t ky (3.13)
ui'-n'-Fky' (3.14)
n - C(p~ - n) (3.1 s)
n' - C(p~ - n') (3.16)
where ~~ - real output
p - producers' price level
j- real fiscal shock (public deficit)
m - nominal money supply
é - nominal interest rate
r - real interest rate
e - nominal exchange rate
c - real cxchange rate
(rclative price of foreign goods in terms of home goods)
w - nominal wage rate
p~ - consumers' price level
n- corc rate of inflation in the cost-of-living index
r - employers' tax (contributions) rate
p;, - real price of imported raw materials.
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The variables r, i and z are ratios expressed as arithmetic differences from
their steady-state values. All other variables are expressed as logarithmic
deviations from their steady-state values. Foreign variables are denoted by
an asterisk.
Equations (3.9) -(3.10) give the cost-of-living indices as weighted avera-
ges of home and foreign prices. The share of imports in total expenditures is
a, which is constant for Cobb-Douglas preferences. Equations (3.3) -(3.5)
define the real rates of interest and the real exchange rate. Equation
(3.8) is the uncovered interest parity condition, which says that the diffe-
rential between the return on home and foreign government bonds must
equal the expected depreciation of the exchange rate. It holds when there are
no exchange controls and when agents engage in risk-neutral arbitrage. These
equations yield
r-r'-(I -2a)Ec, (3.17)
so that the differential in real interest rates is always zero when the share
of foreign goods in total households' expenditures is 50 per cent. Equations
(3.1) -(3.2) are the IS-curves, which say that aggregate demand for goods
increases when the real interest rate or the relative price of home goods falls,
when there is a fiscal expansion, and when there is an expansion of demand
abroad. Upon substítution of (3.17) into (3.1) -(3.2), one obtains the AD-
schedules :
v-- or f óc f-j t yj' f yryEc (3.18)
y' -- ar - bc f I' f YI ~ f ryEc (3. I 9)
where
a-~I(1 -r), a-ó~(1 f r),f-Íl(1 -y') and ry-(1 - 2a)Q~(l- y-).
Equations (3.6) -(3.7) are the Lrf-curves, which show that the demand for
moaey increases with national income and decreases with the nominal interest
rate.j
Firms produce at home and sell in both the home and foreign markets.
The market environment is one of monopolistic competition. Labour and
imported raw materials are the factors of production. It is assumed that the
price of the imported input, say oil, is indexed to the foreign (US) price le-
vel. This leads to an asymmetry in the specification of aggregate supply Cor
Europe and the US (Canzoneri and Gray, 1985); a real appreciation of the
European (home) currcncy decreases the relative price of raw materials to
Europe and therefore increases European production of goods whilst US
(foreign) output is unaffected. Obviously, an increase in the real producers'
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wage, w t t - p, leads to a reduction in the demand for labour and the sup-
ply of goods. The above ideas are captured in equations (3.1 I) -(3.12).5 An
interesting feature is that, as long as the price elasticities of the demand func-
tion for the products of an individual firm are constant, aggregate supply dces
not depend directly on the real exchange rate despite the fact that allowance
has been made for imperfect competition on both the home and foreign mar-
kets. Branson and Rotembcrg ( 1980) argue that the relevant producers' price
is an average of the price they can fetch on the home market and the price
they can fetch on the foreign market, but it is aot clear how their model of
discrimínating monopolists can be consistent with this idea. This means that
their argument that an appreciation of the real exchange rate increases the
real producers' wage and cuts aggregate supply may not hold.
Equations (3.13) -(3.14) are the expectations-augmented Phillips curvese
Equations ( 3.15) -(3.16) show that the expected rates of inflation adjust gra-
dually to the rates of inflation in the cost-of-living indices. Alternatively, one
can interpret the parameters { and {~ as the speeds of indexation at home and
abroad, respectively. The special case of real wage rigidity (RWR) corresponds
to an infinite speed of indexation to increases in the cost of living. Section 2
showed that RWR cannot be rejected at the 5 per cent significance level for the
French, German and Italian economies and that the UK economy is very
close to RWR. The Canadian and US economies display nominal wage rigidity
5. Capital ktters denote actual levels (rather than deviations). Firm i maximises its
profits, P;Y; -(I -}- T)WLi - P.'EP'N;, subject to the demand function for its products,
Y; - K(!'; ~P) - ril (Pi~I~E)- rl: where the constant 1C increases with aggregale output ( Y)
and the real exchange rate (P'E~P) and the elasticities (qi) are constant, and its production
(unction, Y-((Li, N;) whcre ((. ) exhibits decreasing returns to srak (as therc may be othcr
factors, such as capital, that are fixed). The demand functions imply that each firm competes
both with other home firms and with other foreign firms. Profit maximisation yiclds the
conditions that the marginal revenue product of each factor should eoual the real factor
price, that is (t- q-') (t,;(L;, N;) ~ W(1 t t)~P; and (1--r'-')fiv(Li, Nj - P.'EP'~P;whcre
p~,li t rl:. Symmetry yiclds Pi - P. These two first-ordcr conditions yield the optimal
demand for labour and raw materials (and thus aggregate output) as functions of the real
producers' wage, W(1 -} T)~P, and the real cost of raw materials, P„'C. Obviously, the
dcmand for each factor decreases with the price of the own factor price. Whcn factors are
cooperant ((~~nr~ ~ 0), the owput effect dominates the subslitution effect and therefore the
demand for labour (raw materials) decreases with the real price of raw materials (labour).
C-yuations (3.11)-(3.12) follow from log-linearisation and are exact for Cobb-Douglas
produdion functions. The strength of the effects of relative factor prices diminishes when
tlie elasticity of substitution betwcen labour, raw materials and other fixed factors is low.
6. The altcrnativc of overlapping wage contracts (combined with prioe rigidity) em-
bcdded within a numerical two~country model is discussed in Attanasio and van der Ploeg
(1988).
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(NWR) since the hypothesis of RWR was rejected at the 5 per cent level for
these economies. It thereCore seems reasonable to distinguish three cases :
(i) NGVR - NWR' : { - {~ - k - 0, w - m, w' - rn', ~t - I1i -~ ~.
I~2 - Q,
(ii) RWR-RWR': C-C'-~, k-0. w-p~, w'-p~',Pi-~3i,
~.-Q~
(iii) Xt1~R - NWR' : {- oo, k- 0, w- p~, {'- U, w'- m', ~i ~~.
The effects of unemployment on growth in real wages is ignored. Case (i)
corresponds most closely to the conventional Mundell-Fleming world and
describes the interdependence between, say, the US and Canadian economies
(see Section 4). Core inflation is simply equal to the long-run monetary growth
rate. Case (ii) describes the interdependence between, say, the French and
German economies (see Section 5).' Case (iii) allows tor real wage rigidity at
home and nominal wage rigidity abroad and describes the interactions bet-
ween, say, the US and European economies (see Section 6).
lV. NOMINAL WAGE RIGIDITY A1' HOME AND ABROAD :
A MUNDELL - FLEM[NG WORLD
1 v.l Spill-over Effects of Fiscal, Monetary and Supply-side Policies
The case of nominal wage rigidity at home and abroad corresponds
most closely to the standard Mundell-Flemming analysis. It is well known that
in such a world monetary expansion is a beggar-thy-neighbour policy whilst
fiscal expansion is a locomotive policy. The purpose of this section is to
examine whether these results carry through when the conventional two-
country analysis is extended to allow for aggregate supply and expectational
dynamics (cf., Turnovsky, 1985), to analyse the nature of the spill-over effects
of supply-side policy, and to develop a convenient diagrammatic exposition
that can be used for teaching purposes.
The assumption of Ql -. ~ makes matters simple, since the aggregate-
supply schedule is replaced by the constant mark-up hypothesis, p- w f T.
7. Strictly speaking, this docs nol correspond to an economic model of the interdepen-
dence between the Frcnch and German e~conomies as the salient features of lhe European
Monetary System have been ignorcd. Managed intervenlion in the foreign exchange markets
and restricted capital flows also nre important in a lwo-country modcl of the Erench and
German economies (e.g., Artis and Gazioglu, 198~.
1NTERNATIONAL INTERDEPENDENCE IN THE OECD 21
Hence, the nominal interest rate is given by i- r t m-t- T f aEc as wage in-
flation under NWR is simply given by rrw - m. Upon substitution into (3.6),
one obtains the reduced form Lh1-schedule,
y-[.~(rtmfrfaEc)-r]~~. (4.1)
It slopes upwards in r- y space (see Figure 1), because a higher interest
rate chokes off money demand so that a higher level of national iacome is
needed to restore equilibrium in the money market. In the general case (finite
~l), the interpretation is as follows. A higher real interest rate leads to an
excess supply of money and thus to a higher price level. This reduces the
supply of goods, since workers are locked into nominal wage contracts.
Equation (4.1) gives aggregate supply, which should match aggregate demand
given by equation (3.18). The result is equilibrium in the goods market, which
is captured by the GME-locus :
r-[j t yj' f óc ~- [(yq) -(za l w)j ~ -(z l~) (m t i)
f (rISO)j I [Q f (~IfV)]. (4.2)
Similarly, the Ch1E'-locus follows from equations (3.7) and (3.19) and is
given by :
r- U' f yj - óc f fq t(,i(1 - a)I w)j~ -(xl w) (in~ ~- i')
f(r' I w)] I[a t(x I w)j . (4.3)
The Cd1E-locus slopes upwards in r- c space (see Figure l), because a higher
interest rate increases the supply and reduces the demand for home goods
and goods market equilibrium is then restored by an increase in net exports
acliieved by an increase in the relative price of foreign goods. Similarly, the
C.11EY-locus slopes downwards in r- c space.
The equilibrium world intcres[ rate follows from adding (4.2) and (4.3) :
r-' I x[(1 f y) (I f I' t qEi) -(~l I sv) (m t m~ f i ~- i')
f(r t r') I t~j I [a t Ex I w)j (4.4)
where q-(I - 2a) [0(1 - y)-' -t- (~llto)j (1 t y)-' ] 0. Thesteady-stateworld
rcal interest rate decreases whcn budget deficits at home or abroad decrease,
whcn monetary growth rates at home or abroad increase (the "Mundcll ef-
f~cl"), and when reduction in tax rates boost the real supply ofmoney balances.
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Subtraction of (4.3) from ( 4.2) gives the following expression for the expecta-
tional dynamics of the real exchange rate :
~ - lll - r) (I -I') - (~Im) (m - m' ~- T - T') -F~ Ip~(T - Z')
f ~~l ! [U - r)n f (x I w)l - (~.'~
The steady-state relative price of foreign goods increases when public deficits
(or tax rates) abroad are higher than public deficits ( or tax rates) at home, and
when monetary growth exceeds foreign monetary growth. The real exchange
rate jumps immediately to its new equilibrium valuewhen shocks arepermanent
and unanticipated, but transient or anticipated shocks lead to expectational
dynamics ( see for example Figure 2(b) and the associated discussion in Sec-
tion 5.1). Rea) liquidities, m- w and m' - w', are constant, due to the
assumption of (-[' - k- 0, and thereCore the adjustment to permanent
and unanticipated shocks is instantaneous. Previous studies (e.g., Turnovsky.
1985) allowed for an effect of unemployment on growth in nominal wages
(k ;E 0), so that the steady-state level of output is always at its natural rate
and unaffected by fiscal or monetary policy. This is not so in the present
model, since it is concerned with the intermediate run.
The eCfects of an unanticipated, permanent increasc in the home public
deficit are presented in Figure 1(a). The resulting excess demand for home
goods is choked off by an appreciation of the hotne real exchange rate and
an increase in the world intcrest rate. The increase in the demand for foreign
goods is due to the depreciation of the foreign real exchange rate, but despite
y.zy., y3y. ~, ~
FlGURE l(a). Wage Rigidity at Home and Abroad ( Unanticipated increase in f)
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the increase in the world interest rate. Supply at home and abroad increases,
because the reduction in the demand for real cash balances boosts the price
level and erodes the real value of the nominal wage. It follows that fiscal
policy is a locomotiut policy.
The effects of an unanticipated, permanent increase in the home monetary
growth are presented if Figure 1(b). The expected inflation rate increases one-
for-one, which reduces the world real interest rate ("Mundell effect") and
therefore increases aggregate demand at home and abroad. The home nomi-
nal interest rate increases whilst the foreign nominal interest rate decreases,
so that the demand for real money balances at home decreases, the home price
level rises and home aggregate supply is boosted whilst foreign aggregate
supply falls. The resulting excess demand for foreign goods is choked off
by an increase in the relative price of foreign goods. Clearly, an expansion of
monetary growth is a beggar-thy-iuiglebour policy. Figure 1(b) is also relevant
LM-LM'
Y~ Y-Y~ Y'~ C c'
FIGURE t(b). Nominal Wage Rigidity at Home and Abroad ( Unanticipated increase in m
or cut in i)
for an unanticipated, permanent tax incentive, so that supply-side improve-
mcnts also have negative spill-over effects in a N[NR - NWR' world. The
rcason is that a cut in the employers' tax rate, reduces the price level and
boosts the real supply of money balances, which has the same effects as the
cut in thc real demand for money balances induced by an increase in monetary
growth.
So far, it has been argued that, in a Mundell-Fleming world with nominal
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wage rigidity at home and abroad, monetary expansion is a beggar-thy-neigli-
bour policy. However, some argue that monetary expansion is a locomotive po-
licy (e.g., Minford, 1985). The reason for this is that in the former case one
is concerned with a bond-financed monetary expansion, i.e., the government
purchases bonds from the private sector, whilst in the latter case a monetary
expansion is associated with a looser fiscal stance, i.e., lower taxes or higher
government spending. ]f one ignores interest payments on the public debt,
the government budget constraint for the latter case is given by log(m) -
j-(m - p) or, under NWR, by log(m) -j f r so that a change in monetary
growth leads to a change in fiscal change (dj- dm~m). In empirical work the
locomotive effects of the associated fiscal expansion seem to outweigh the
beggar-thy-neighbour effects of the expansion in monetary growth (MinCord,
1985).
A joint fiscal expansion shitts up both the GME- and the GME'-locus,
so pushes up the world real interest rate and leaves the real exchange rate
unaffccted. The resulting Call in the demand for real money balances in each
country generates an expansion of employment and output throughout the
world. A joint incroase in monetary growth óas no effect on the real exchange
rate, but reduces the world real interest rate and increases nominal interest
rates and global activity. A joint improvement in supply-side conditions has
similar effects.
An anticipated, permanent increase in the home fiscal deficit leads to
an immediate jump appreciation of the real exchange rate followed by further
appreciations during the announcement period (see Figure 2(b)). At the time
of implementation there is no jump in the real exchange rate, because the news
has already been discounted in the financial markets. The result is that home
output and employment Call on impact of the news and fall further during the
announcement period, whilst foreign output and employment increase on
impact and increase further during the announcement period. At the time of
implementation, the real interest rate and home output jump up. Hence,
an anticipated increase in home demand leads to a current recession at home
and boom abroad.
]v.2 International Coordination oj Monetary Policies
]n a NWR- NWR' world, monetary growth, fiscal expansion and supply-
side improvements are, respectively, a beggar-thy-neighbour, locomotive
and beggar-thy-neighbour policy, so that in the absence of international
policy coordination these policies are, respectively, too expansionary, too
tight and too Car-reaching. To illustrate these issues, this section concentrates
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on the detcrmination of (bond-financed) monetary growth when the public
deficit and supply-side policies are kept constant ( say, T- s' - f- j' - 0).
There is a recent literature on the international coordination of monetary poli-
cies ( Miller and Salmon, 1985; Currie and Levine, 1985; Oudiz and Sachs,
1985; and Rogoff 1985), but this literature typically relies on numerical si-
mulation to assess the potential merits of policy coordination. Also, it in-
corporates the natural rate hypothesis so that there is no long-run trade-off
between inflation and output. The present analysis is for the intermediate
run and dces allow for such a trade-off. To keep matters simple, the share of
imports in final expenditures is assumed to be 50 per cent (a - l~t). In such a
world p - ru - m,
P~-mt `IY~-'Is(mtin')f(dpl~k, (a.6)
r- r` -- 1~' ~(otv t .1)-I (m t ms). (a.7)
y-,i~p1(r t m t IIYEc) - óc t E(m f m') (a.8)
Ec - m' - m t(2ó~p ~~lk~ e - l~, t.l(T{p t d)-' ~ 0 (a.9)
and
where e-'~2.ï(oto t~)-' ~ 0. A joint increase in monetary growth increases
world inflation one-for-one and expands global activity.
The policy dilemma of each government is that it wants a high monetary
growth rate in order to achieve a high level of activity and that it wants a low
monetary growth rate in order to achieve low inflation. For the home govern-
ment, this is captured by the following social welfare problem :
Min 1 12 ~~[W(y - y)8 - ~ p~21 eXp(-p!)d1, w. y, v, ~ o., (a.lo)~, o
subject to (a.6) -(4.9), where y,, y and p denote the relative priority attached
to achieving the full-cmployment target, the full-employment (desired) target
of home activity and the social rate of time prcference, respectively. The policy
dilemma is that a policy of no inflation leads to a too low level of activity
(y ~ 0). The home country's social welfare problem can be rewritten as :
p~
Min 'Ís J ~ W~ óc f e(nt f m') - Y~Y f(l~s(m -I- m') f(a~p~.lk) 8~ exp(-pt)dt
~ o (a. l l )
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subject to (4.9). The foreign country's social welfare problem can be written as:
Min'~~ ~ ~1v[-bc f e(m t m') - Y)! t [l~s(m
,;,. o
t m') - (a~lxk] g ~ exp(-Pt)dt
(4.12)
subject to (4.9), where the foreign government is assumed to have the same
preferences as the home government.
When the two governments decide on their optimal monetary policies in
a decentralised fashion and when they cannot pre-commit themselves to these
policies vis-à-vis the private sector, the (open-loop) Nash equilibrium with
pre-commitment is the appropriate solution concept. The relevant first-
ordcr conditions are :
yic[dc t E(m f m') - Y) f 1~:[l~s(m -1- m') f(a~p~~kl - x- 0 (4.13)
we[-8c t e(m t m') -Yl t'~s ['~~(m f m') -(a~ ~zk) } z' - ~ (4.14)
X-[P - 2(ów Ix)] xa - w a [- a~ t E(;n t ;n') - y]
-(ówla)['l:(m t m') t(~vl~kl, x(o) - o (4.1s)
a' -[P - 2(8rp ~Z)) x' -F yIb [- Sc i- E(m -~ m') - Y)
t(á~p~.l) ['~x(m f m') -(awl~kl. x'(~) - ~ (4.16)
where x (z') denotes the undiscounted shadow price of the real exchange
rate to the home (foreign) goverament. At the beginning of the planning
horizon, the real exchange rate is free to jump and therefore its contribution
to social welfare at that time must be zero (cf., Calvo, 1978); x(0) - x'(0) - 0.
Subtraction of (4.14) and (4.13) and addition of (4.15) and (4.16) yields
z(t)f x'(t) - c(t) - 0, for all t~ 0. Equation (4.9) then gives m- m', so that
y- y' - 2 Em and p- p~ - m. Addition of (4.13) and (4.14) then gives
z- z' - l~s(1 t 4weg) (m t m~`) - 2yie y, (4.17)
so that subtraction of (4.16) from (4.1s) yields
m-[P - 4(1 t 4Wcz)-1 [(ó~V I2) f Wóc(l t 2etp)] ] m f 2w(1-1.4~yez)-i
[a - [P - 2(óSO~2))E)Y. m(0) - 2wc(1 -~ 4we:)-lY - mc. (4.18)
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Thc solution of (4.18) is given by
m(t) - m'(t) - mn -t- (mc - mN) eXp( - ~Nt), (4.19)
where the steady-state Nash equilibrium value of monetary growth is given by
m,v - 2w(I f ay,EZ)-t [b -[n - 2(ó~l~))e]y I~N (a.2o)
and the speed of policy adjustment under decentralised policy making is
gi~~en b~~
~.- - a(I f 4 wEZ)-' [(aw Ix) f wa~(1 f 2~~)l - v~ o. (4.21)
Thc outcome under international coordination of monetary policies and
pre-commitment is obtained by choosing m and m' to minimise the sum of
the t~vo countries' welfare loss funetions subject to (4.9). This yields c(t) - 0,
p~(t) - m(t)- mc, Y(t) - Y'(t) - 2ainc and r(t) - r'(t) - -2,i(o~ f~,)-imc,
for all t) 0 as the outcomes under international policy coordination.
It can easily be shown that the inequality inp ~ m~ holds, so that the mone-
tary growth rates that prevail in the absencx ofinternational policy coordina-
tion are excessive. This is due to the fact that an increase in monetary growth
is a beggar-thy-neigbour policy and that each government ignores the adverse
consequences of such a policy on the rival government. The optima) non-
cooperative policies are time inconsistent (Kydland and Prescott, 1977), since
if a government reneges and re-optimises at a later date it pays to reduce
monetary growth again to its cooperative level and subsequently raise it
gradually to its non cooperative level. The "loss of leadership" solution
(Buitcr, 1984) is an open-loop, time-consistent Nash equilibrium solution,
since it assumes that the governments ignore, or do not manipulate, the
forward-looking component of the real exchange rate. This means that x(t) -
- x~(t) - 0, Cor all t] 0, instead of (4.15}{4.1~, so that rre(t) - in'(t) - mc
is the competitive, time-consistent outcome. The cooperative outcome is
time consistent, so that when governments cannot pre-commit there is no
gain from international policy coordination. In fact, when the governments
cannot pre-commit and the economies eventually return to their natural
rates (k ~ 0), international policy coordination is only a transient issue and can
be counter-productive (Rogoff, 1985)e
8. Whcn the time inconsistency of optimal monetary poticies arises in lhe form of a
surprise inflation tax, it can tx shown that international coordination can also be counter-
productivc when govcrnnxnts qnnot prc-commit themselvcs (van der Ploeg, 1988).
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V. REAL WAGE RIGIDITY AT HOME AND ABROAD
v.l Spil!-over Effects of Fiscal and Supply-side Policies
Now consider case ( ii), which assumes real wage rigidity at home and
abroad. This might characterise economic interdependence within Europe.
Substitution of w- p~, ( 3.5) and (3.9) into (3.11) yields the AS-schedule :
Y - -~1(att -f r) t ~y. (5.1)
Aggregate supply increases whenever the wedge betwcen the producers' wage
and the consumers' wage, i.e., ac t T,' decreases. Hence, when the real ex-
change rate depreciates, the cost-of-living for workers and therefore their
wage claim increases so that firms employ less labour and produce less out-
put." Similarly, an increase in the employers' tax rate reduces incentives to
employ labour and produce output. Both the home and foreign AS-schedules
are drawn in the bottom half of Figure 2(a).
Intersection of the AD-schedule (3.18), and the AS-schedule (5.1), yields
equilibrium in the home goods market. This gives rise to the GME-locus.
r- U f rJ' t~li -~~ f(ó f a~lk f rl~l Ia (5.2)
and, similarly, to the CME'-locus
r-(.i~` t Yff QlT' -~; -(b t al~ik f rl~) ~Q (5.3)
(see Figure 2(a)). The CME-locus slopes upwards, because the excess supply
of goods induced by a rise in the real interest rate is choked off by a depre-
ciation of the real exchange rate which boosts net exports and cuts aggregate
supply. Intersection of the GME-locus and the GME'-locus yields the rela-
tive price of foreign goods in terms of home goods :
~-'I:((1 - Y) U' -J't nEc} t lil(T' - T) f Ita - It~ ] I(3 t aQi). (5.4)
Thc real intcrest rate and output then follow upon substitution of (5.4) into
9. In gcneral, one should also add the employecs' tax rate and the indirect tax rale to
the wcdgc.
10. Note that, in contrast to Branson and Rotemberg (I980), aggregate supply never
rises when the real cxchange rate depreciates (thus exclud'wg their example of the Hong
Kong economy).







FlGURE 2(a). Real Wage Rigidity at Home and Abroad (Unanticipated increase in t)
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(5.2) and (S.l). Alternatively, the comparative statics can be deduced from
Figure 2(a).
An unanticipated permanent fiscal expansion at home shifts up the
Gtt1E-locus by more than the G111E'- locus, so that the incipient excess demand
for goods is choked off by a rise in the world real interest rate and a fall in
the relative price of home goods. The real appreciation of the home currency
occurs instantaneously. It reduces the wedge and increases aggregate supply
at home, but increases the wedge and reduces aggregate supply abroad. The
boost in foreign aggregate demand, due to the real depreciation of the forcign
exchange rate and the increase in home activity, and the fall in foreign aggre-
gate supply must be choked off by the rise in the world real interest rate.
Cle:irly, fiscal expansion is a be~ar-thy-neighbour policy in a RWR-RWR'
world. This contrasts with a NWR- NWR' (Mundell-Flemíng) world, where
fiscal expansion is a locomotive policy (see Section 4). The fall in foreign
output and the increase in the world interest rate reduces the demand for real
forcign money balances, so that the Coreign price level must increase. The
effect on the home price level is ambiguous. Note that, under purchasing
power parity (S --~ ~), neither home nor fiscal policy can affect the wedge
and consequently output and employment.
The expectational dynamics can be deduced from Figure 2(b). An anti-
cipated permanent fiscal expansion at home leads to a jump appreciation
of the rcal exchange rate and thus to an immediate expansion of home activity
and fall in foreign activity. The real exchange rate is expected to appreciate,
so that there is a real-intcrest-rate differential in favour of the home coun-
try during thc announcement period AB. The GME'-locus shifts down more
than the G~41E-locus, so that the home real interest rate falls during the an-
nouncement period. This generates the extra demand to choke off the excess
supply of goods induced by the real appreciation of the exchange rate. Simi-
larly, the foreign real interest rate must increase during the adjustment
period. Obviously, during the adjustment period, home activity continues to
incrcase and foreign activity continues to fall. At the time of implementation
of the home fiscal expansion, there is no jump in the real exchange rate and
no change in home or foreign activity as the fiscal expansion has already
been discounted in the financial markets. Instead, there is an implementation
eff~ct Ieading to an upward jump in the world real interest rate which com-
pletely crowds out the increase in demand caused by the fiscal expansion.
Since the home real interest rate rises above its original equilibrium value, it
is clear that it misadjuslswhen there is an anticipated fiscal expansion.
Au unanticipated permanent improvement ia home supply, due to a cut
in the home tax rate or an increase in óome productivity, shifts down the
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C1TIE-locus and shifts out the AS-schedule. The increase in home supply is
partially accommodated by the increase in demand due to the fall in the world
rcal interest rate and the depreciation of the real exchange rate, but obviously
the latter effect increases the home wedge and crowds cut some of the initial
increase in home suply. The counter-part of this is that the foreign wedge
falls and thus foreign activity inereases. Foreign demand increases due to the
fall in the world interest rate and despite the improvement in foreign net
FIGURE 2(b). Real Wage Rigidity at Home and Abroad (Anlicipaled increase in f)
exports. Hence, supply-side improvements are a locomoliae policy in a ItGVR-
RT~VR' world.
A joint fiscal expansion or a joint improvement in supply-side conditions
has no real effects whatsoever in this symmetric two-country world, although
it does increase world interest rates and reduce price Tevels. This is in con-
trast to the effects in a NWR-NWR' world (see Section 4.1). A monetary ex-
pansion, either at home or abroad. has no real effects in a RWR-RWR' world.
32 FREDERICK VAN DER PLOEG
Due to full indexation ofwages to the cost-of-living index, a unilateral moneta-
ry expansion leads to a one-for-one increase in the home price level, a one-
for-one depreciation of the nominal exchange rate and no effect on output
and employment. However, if the model is extended to allow for investment
and capital accumulation, an interdependent Mundell-Tobin effect emerges.
An increase in home monetary growth reduces theworld real interest rate and
therefore increases capital, employment and output both at home and abroad,
so that it is a locomotivc policy (van der Plceg, 1986).
It follows that fully indexed economies are insulated from monetary
shocks, but are more responsive to real supply-side (say, tax or oil) shocks.
Finally, it may be useful to consider the special case of perfect substitu-
tion between home and foreign goods, i.e., purchasíng power parity (b -~ ~).
In that case, the real exchange rate and the wedge between the producers'
and consumers' wage are fixed so that output at home and abroad are unaf-
fected by fiscal or supply-side policies (see equations (5.1) and (5.4)).
v.2 Internationa! Coordination of Fiscal Policy
In a RWR-RWR' world monetary growth directly affects inflation and
has neither a transient nor a persistent effect on real activity. A fiscal expansion
at home benefits activity at home and reduces activity abroad. The adverse
effects of a fiscal expansion are higher budget deficits, which to the extent
that they are financed by an increase in monetary growth have an adverse
effect on inflation. The policy dilemma of each country is that they want a
high level of government spending for high activity, but a low level of govern-
ment spending for low inflation. These are exercises in the optimal determina-
tion of fiscal policy, so that the effects of supply-side policies are suppressed
(T - i' - Qs - Qs` - 0). The policy dilemma of the home country is captur-
ed by the following social welfare problem :
Min l~z .l (W(Y - Y)' tfzj exP (-Pt)dt, Y~. Y. P ó 0, (5.5)
! o
subject to (5.1) and (5.4),where w is the relative priority attached to achieving
the full-employment target, y is the full-employment (desired) level of home
activity, and p is the government's rate of time preference. The policy dilemma
is that a balanced budget or a budget consistent with no inflation leads to a
too low level of activity and that achievement of the full-employment target
lcads to excessíve government deficits and inflation. ?he home country's
welfare problem can be rewritten as :
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subject to
~
Min ']s ~~ [yr(c ~- i)' fj~] exp(- pl)dt, yr, i ~ 0 (s.tí)
~ o
Ei -(rc fJ-j')I n, c(0) - rree (s.7)
where W - y~ (~ia)s, i - y J (~la) and I' - 2(8 ~- ~la) J(1 - y) (assumed to
exceed r~p). The foreign country faces a similar welfare problem :
~
Min 'J: ~ [w'(c - ~: ~ j'sJexp (- pl)dl, qr' ~ 0 (5.8)
~~
subject to (5.7), where allowance has been made for the possibility that the
two countries may attach different priorities to achieving the full-employment
target.
When the governments of the two countries can pre-commit and decide
on their optimal fiscal policies in a competitive fashion, the Nash equilibrium
with pre-commitment is the appropriate solution concept. The relevant first-
order conditions can be written as :
j`- -[(rl ry) - PJ jf(w I ry) (c f i), j(o) - o. (s.9)
J'` --[(rl n) - vl j' -(w' I n) (~ T i). j'(o) - 0. (s.lo)
and (s.7), where the adjoint variable associated with the real exchange rate
for the home ( foreign)country is given by- ryj(ryj'). Since the real exchange
rate is free to jump at time zero, its marginal contribution to social welfare
at that time must be zero (cf., Calvo, 1978) and therefore j(t)) -j~(0) - 0
must hold. It follows from subtraction of (5.10) from ( s.9) and from (5.7)
that, when w- W~, c(l) - y(l) - y~(l) - I(l) - j~(l) - o, for l~ o, so
that r(f) - r'(1) -(( t y)f(1) Ja and
j(l) -j'(l) -jN{I - ezP[-[rI ry) - PJlll. jn - wil (r - ryP). (s.ll)
Note that, when the share of imported goods in total expenditures is 50 per
cent, the adjustment to the steady-state Nash equilibrium levels of public
spcnding is instantaneous (j(l) - j'(l) -jN, for l~ 0, when a- lJ~. In
gcncral (a ~'JY), the levcls of public deficits are at their no-inflation levels at
the start of the planning horizon and afterwards gradually increase towards
their steady-state Nash equilibrium levels. This means that the optimal levels
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of public deficits in the Nash equilibrium with pre-commitment are time in-
consistent; when the governments re-optimise after some time they will want
to tighten their fiscal policies back to the no-inflation levels.
When the governments of the two countries engage in international
policy coordination with pre~ommitment, they minimise the global weUare
loss and take account of the constraint that the real exchange rate and there-
fore activity cannot be affected. Hence, when yr - yi', c(t) - y(t) - Y`(t) -
- r(t) - r'(t) - j(t) - j'(t) - 0, t~ 0, are the cooperative outcomes.
There is no problem of time inconsistency when international policy coor-
dination takes place.
The non-cooperative outcomes lead to excessive levels of public deficits
relative to the cooperative outcomes. This is a consequence of the beggar-
thy-neighbour nature of fiscal policies in a RWR-RWR' world, since in the
non-cooperative outcomes each government ignores the adverse consequences
of a fiscal expansion on the other economy. In effect, each country attempts
(in vain) to liave a high real exchange rate in order to boost employment at
home and export unemployment and this is what leads to excessive public
deficits. The cooperative outcomes realise the futility of such actions and
increase welfare by setting the public deficits at their no-inflation levels. The
inefficiencies of the non-cooperative outcomes increase when the priorities
attached to achieving the full-employment targets increase, when the desired
levels of activity increase, and when the governments' discount rates increase.
When the home country (say, France) attaches a higher priority to the
employment target than the foreign country (say, Germany), the steady-
state Nash equilibrium levels of the real exchange rate and the fiscal deficit
are given by :
~..~ -(w' - w) ~ I[(r -~rv)r t w t w`l ~ o (s.12)
jN - w[2w' t(r -~v)r] ~ I((r - vn) [(r - nv)~ f w t w'] }~ o (s.l 3)
so that y,v ~ 0~ yN' and jn ~ jN' ~ 0. The country that attaches a higher
priority to achieving full employment ends up with a higher level of activity,
at the expense of a lower level of activity in the other economy, and a higher
levcl of the public deficit and inflation.
As far as supply-side improvements are concerned, they are a locomo-
tive policy in a RWR-RWR' world. It is clear that, in the absence of internatio-
nal policy coordination, supply-side improvements do not go far enough as
each country ignores the beneficial effects on the other country.
It may be useful to relate the analysis of this section to the pioneering
INTERNATIONAL INTERDEPENDENCE IN THE OECD 3S
work of Hamada (1985. Chapter 5) on the international coordination of mo-
netary policies. Although Hamada was concerned with a full~mployment
multi-country world, the international trade-offs for monetary policies are
similac in a RWR-RWR' world. Consider the case of floating exchange rates
first. Monetary growth has no real effects, so that each country sets its opti-
mal monetary growth to its desired rate of inflation. Since the monetary
authorities do not face a policy trade-off, there is no role for international
policy coordination. Now consider the case of pegged exchange rates (~ - 0).
Increases in monetary growth (m) are cither due to increases in the rate of
domestic credit expansion ( d) or due to balance-of-payments surplusses,
expressed as a ratio of the money supply (z). The monetary approach to the
balance of payments then gives the balance-of-payments ratio of each country
as the excess of the common inflation rate (n) over its rate of domestic credit
expansion, i.e., Z- n- d - RR -F '~s (d' - d), where the ratio of the increase
in international reserves to the world money supply is denoted by Rr and
the world inflation rate is given by n- p - p' - ~rR f 1~f (d i- d'). Denote
each country's desired inflation rate by s - a' and desired balance of pay-
ments ratio by z. Hamada shows that, in the absence of international policy
coordination, world inflation (a) is higher ( lower) than desired inflation (a),
when the increase in international reserves (aa) is larger (smaller) than the
weighted averages ofthe desircd incrcases in international reserves ('~:(Zf:')).
Vl. REAL WAGE RIGIDITY IN EUROPE AND NOMINAL WAGE
RiGIDITY IN THE U.S.
vl.l Asy~nmetries in International Interdependence
The interactions between the European (home) and US (foreign) econo-
mies are best described by an asymmetric world, that is real wage rigidity
is assumed for Europe (and Japan) and nominal wage rigidity for the US and
Canada ( see Section 2). In that case, the world real interest rate and the real
exchange rate follow from the intersection of the CME-locus, ( 5.2), and the
Ctf1E'-locus, (4.3), suitably modified to allow for the effects of imported
raw materials. European output depends on the real exchange rate and follows
from the A S-schedule,
Y-- QI (ac ~- r) f~~ (6. l)
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where a- a t~s and ~g -~e -~1 ~~Qn'. whilst US output depends on the
US interest rate and follows from the reduced-form LM'-schedule,
y'-[2[r-1-m'tt't~~p:-(1-a)ÈcJ-T'-~p:J~~- (6.2)
Hence, both European and US aggregate supply decrease when the price of
oil (fixed in terms of US goods) increases. The AS-schedule is steeper than
before, because a real depreciation of the European currency not only increases
the wedge but also increases the real price of oi! to Europe. The comparative
statistics of unanticipated, permanent shocks can be deduced by diagramma-
tic means (see Figure 3). The equilibrium real interest rate is given by
r-{(y(ó t á~~ t óJj t(ó ~- á~l t yó)j' -1- ~lóT
t(ó t aYl){p 1(T' -} ~Z~w )- Á(tS t a~~-1 (m ' t~T'
t~~w ) - aY9
t[(~ f x(1 - a)~r ') (ó t~~~ t yn~l ~} I e (6.3)
and the equilibrium real exchange rate follows from
c-{-((o t,t l~v) - yQJ jt[-(Q t.i I!D)Y t aJj' -~i(a t .~ Isv)T
t~v 'a[T' t RsP~ - .1(m' t i' t ~:p. )I t(o t x~fo)~a
- IY~I(a t 2 IS~) - Q(7 -} 2Só 1(1 - a))J Et} ~ d (6.4)
where d-(a t.lrp1) (E t a~l) t áo ~ 0. The real exchange rate. and con-
sequently all other endogenous variables, jump instantaneously to their new
equilibrium values in response to unanticipated permanent shocks, as long
as the saddlepoint condition is satisfied (a.i(1 - a) t arltv(1 - y) ~.iqy),
which is definitely the case for a- l~z. Figure 2(b) can be used to analyse the
effccts of anticipated, permanent shocks.
The effects of an unanticipated permanent increase in the European
public deficit are presented in Figure 3(a). The excess demand for European
goods is partially choked off by a fall in the relative price of US goods, which
induces an increase in European supply and US demand and a fall in Euro-
pean demand for goods, and by a rise in the world interest rate, which induces
a fall in the European and US demand for goods and an increase in the US
supply of goods. The above is captured by the fact that the upward shift of
the CAIE-locus dominates the upward shift of the CA1E'-locus. It shows that
a European fiscal expansion increases output and employment in both Europe











FIGURE 3(a). Interdependence of the European and US Economies (Unanticipated increase
in the Europcan public deficit)
and the US and is therefore a locomotine policy. For a US fiscal ezpansion, the
shift in the GA1E'-locus, typically (as long as a(1 - y)~ ~,Iy), dominates
the shift in the GA1E-locus and therefore results in a rise in the world interest
rate and, typically, an increase in the relative price of US goods. Hence, a
US fiscal expansion increases output in the US and, typically, leads to a de-
preciation of the Europcan real exchange rate, an increase in the European
wedge and therefore a reduction in European output. It is therefore, typically,
a beggar-thy-neighbour policy. However, if the negative effects oC financial
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crowding out on European consumption and investment are not too important
relatíve to the positive spill-over effects of US activity on European exports
(if ó{v~.i ~ y), a US fiscal expansion increases European output and employ-
ment and therefore is a locomotirx policy. Plausible parameter values are
á - 0.5, ~p - 1.0, ,l - 0.5 and y- 0.3, which suggests that a US fiscal ex-
pansion is a beggar-thy-aeighbour policy. It will be assumed that this is the
typical case.
An increase in European monetary growth has no real effects, because
European wages are indexed to increases in the cost-of-living. It simply in-
creases the European ínflation and nominal interest rates one-for-one. The
effects of an unanticipated, permanent increase in the US monetary growth
rate are presented in Figure 3(b). It increases the US nominal interest rate,
cuts US demand for real money balances, exerts an upward pressure on the
US price level, erodes the real value of the US wage, and therefore increases
US aggregate supply. This is partially accommodated by the increase in the
demand for US goods due to a fall in the relative price of US goods and a fall
in the US real interest rate. The associated appreciation of the European real
exchange rate, reduces the wedge between the European consumers' and
producers' wage, and therefore raises European supply. European demand
rises due to the fall in the world real interest rate. Clearly, US monetary
growth is a locomotia~ policy. A cut in the US tax rate also raises US aggregate
supply and therefore raises output and employment in Europe as well as in
the US. Hence, a US tax cut is a locomotiuc policy. A cut in the European
tax rates shifts out the AS-schedule and shifts down the GME-locus, so that
the real interest rate falls, the European real exchange rate appreciates and
European output increases. US output falls, so supply-side improvements in
Europe are a beggar-thy-neighbour policy.
An increase in the real price of oil (in terms of US goods) shifts in the
AS- and L~11'-schedules and consequently shifts up the GME- and ChIE'-loci.
The fall in the world supply of goods índuces a rise in the world real interest
rate, which attenuates the adverse effects of the oil shock on US supply. The
cffect on the real cxchange rate (and therefore on European output) is ambi-
guous, but, if o ~~l( arpt~l), the adverse effects on US supply dominate the
adverse effects on European supply and then the relative price of US goods
increases. In that case, the European real exchange rate depreciates and
thercfore the adverse effects of an oil shock on European supply are accen-
tuated rather than attenuated. This therefore seems to suggest that an oil
shock hits European output and employment much harder than US output
and employment.











FIGURE 3(b). Interdependence of the European and US Economies ( Unanticipated increase
in US monetary growth or cut in the US taz rate)
v1.2 Interi:ationalEconomic Policy Coordination
Section 6.1 showed that a European fispl expansion, an increase in US
monetary growth and a US tax cut stimulate output at home and abroad.
This means that, in the absence of international policy coordination, the US
(Europe) ignores the beneficial effects on European (US) output and employ-
ment of an increase in monetary growth or a supply-side incentive (a fiscal
expansion). Hence, the US has a too low monetary growth rate and does not
offer enough supply-side improvements whilst Europe's fiscal stance is too
tight relative to the outcomes under international policy coordination. Similar-
ly, a cut in European employers' taxes and, typically, a US fiscal expansion
have negative spill-over effects. This means that in the absence of internationa
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policy coordination, European supply-side improvements are too far-reach-
ing and US fiscal policy is, typically, too tight.
Now consider in detail the case of the optimal determination of the Euro-
pean and US public deficits when they are financed by bonds. The social wel-
fare functions are given by (5.5), where after the OPEC shocks y ~ y' as an
oil price shock hits Europe harder than the US. The description of the Euro-
pean and US economies follows upon substitution of (6.4) and (6.3) into (6.1)
and (6.2) and from (6.4):
y- w, f- uhf' t co, m' - cu~ E~, (6.5)
y. - u~.j. f~,.jf w,. in. - ca~ Éc, (6.6)
E[ - cds t t Co~f - ~Í' -i- (.~~ m', (6.7)
where o)1 ~ 0, cui ~ 0, i- 3, 8, cvi' ~ 0, i- 1, 4, sign (u~ - sign (cv,) and
ws ~ p. With the same procedure as used in Sections 4.2 and 5.2, one finds
that in the absence of international policy coordination the optimal steady-
state public deficits when governments can pre~ommit themselves must
satisry :
J-- w(y - y) - w(wsl' t~1(1 f ww~) (6.8)
I' - w' (Y' - y') --w' (w~'I - r')1(1 f w'w~'). (6.9)
where w- y~ [wi f P~sws(ws - P)-1] ~ 0 and w' - W[~i` - Pws'~i
(cus -p)-1] ~0. Both countries "lean against the wind", that is the public deficit
is increased when output falls below its full-employment level. If Europe re-
duces its deficit, US output faUs and therefore the US government reacts and
increases its deficit. The European asymptotic reaction curve is upward- or
downward-sloping depending on whether a US fiscal expansion is a beggar-
thy-neighbour or a locomotive policy, respectively. If the positive spil!-over
effect of US activity on European exports is dominated by financial crowding
out (y ~ a~p~.t), a US fiscal expansion is a beggar-thy-neighbour policy (m2~Q)
and therefore Europe reacts with a fiscal expansion as well. The Nash equili-
brium solution corresponds to the intersection of the reaction curves (6.8)-
(6.9) and yields :
I- [(1 t w`w~') w y t w w: w` y'l IdN -IN (6.10)
f' - [-yv'u~a' yi y -F ( 1 ~- 1Ywi) 1v' Y'] Idn -IN' (6.11)
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where dn- -(1 f Wwi) ( l f W'wI') f W ws W' wi ~ 0. Note that, when the
desired change in home output increases, each country inereases its public
sector deficit, and more so when the relative priority on achieving the full-
employmenl targct ( w) is high. An increase in the desired change in output in
Europe prompts an increase in the European deficit, which increases US
output and therefore the US can afford to have a tighter deCicit (8jN' ~8y ~ 0).
An increase in the desired change in US output only leads to a tighter Euro-
pean deficit when a US fiscal expansion is a locomotive policy, but otherwise
it leads to a looser European deficit (BjN~ay' ~ 0 when ms ~ 0). The optimal
public deficits oC the Nash equilibrium solution are time-inconsistent, because
when the governments re-optimise it pays them to reset the public deficits to
(6.10) and (6.1I) with p set equal to zero. In fact, the "loss-of-leadership"
solution (Buiter, 1984) corresponds to (6.10) and ( 6.11) with p set equal to
zero. It corresponds to higher public deficits when both countries' policies
are locomotive policies (a~s ~ 0), but otherwise the US public deficit may be
smaller.
The outcome under international policy coordination minimises a global
wclfare loss function, where w is the relative weight of the European welCare
loss. The steady-state reactions for the cooperative outcome are :
j - - w(y - ~ - w-Iw.(y` - y') (6.12)
j'--W'(r'-y')t~~ (y-y) (6.13)
where tv. - W{~s' f pwiwa(ws - p)-1] ~ 0 and {v: - iv [WS f PWiwi
(w~ - p)-'] is positive (negative) when a US fiscal expansion is a beggar-thy-
neighbour (locomotive) policy. Hence, as long as fiscal expansions are loco-
motive policies, they respond to unemployment at home and abroad. How-
ever, if a US fiscal cxpansion is a beggar-thy-neighbour policy, the US tightens
its deficit when there is unemployment in Europe. The resulting asymptotic
levels of the public deCicit under cooperation are :
j- {
d~vjiy i- y~sW : (w,'y f wZy') f~-1W.y' } - fe (6.14)
{ dn f u~:~y: (co f Yiswi ) f ms Y~.w 1 f Id: ~'W.~I }
I~ - { dN~N ~- Ij~.V~ : (w~y' - wa'r) - ww: r} - j. (6.l s)
{ dN ~- coaY~: (w f Waws') t W:'Wsw lf W: wt'Wswl }- ~
Intuitively, one expects that the European fiscal stance is too tight ( jN ~ jc)
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and that, when a US fiscal expansion is a beggar-thy-neighbour policy, the
US fiscal stance is too loose ( jN' ~jc'). However, this result dces aot follow
immediately. To illustrate the conditions under which this result holds, it is
best to consider two special cases.
Consider the case where the world planning authority only cares about
US welfare (w -~ 0, y- 0). In that case, it is easy to show that the planner
allows the US to maintain a public sector deficit consistent with no inflation
(jc' - 0) whilst Europe is forced to have an inflationary deficit in order to
achieve full employment in the US (fc - y'~wi ~ 0). In the absence of in-
ternational policy coordination, the US fiscal stance is too loose(f~' ~ fc'-0)
whilst the European fiscal stance is too tight (jx - jc (w~aiWW' ~dK) ~ fc)-
This explains why the US urges Europe to expand, especially as this would
justify a fiscal contraction in the US (see (6.9)). To understand Europé s
reluctance to engage in a fiscal expansion, consider the case where the world
planning authority only cares about European welfare (cu -~ ao, y' - 0).
Now ihe world planner allows Europe to have a zero-inflation deficit (jc - 0)
whilst the US must, typically, have a deflationary deficit in order to achieve
full employment in Europe (fc' - -y ~ w~ ~ 0 for uh ~ 0). Now absence of
international policy coordination means that the European fiscal stance is
too loose (j,v ~jc - 0) and the US fiscal stance is, typically, also too loose
(o ~ jN` -Ic'(wzws'WW'~dN) ~fe` for ws ~ 0). Since the European fiscal
stance is now too loose, it is undcrstandable that the European governments
have been reluctant to succumb to US pressure to expand.
It is possible to generalise the above results to allow both countries to
have an unemployment problem (-y, y' ~ 0). When the world planner only
cares about US welfare (w --~ 0), it can be shown that fN ~ jc -y' ~ w9` and
(as long as fn' ~ ~) I~x' ~,Íc' - 0 still holds. Also, when only European
welfare matters (w --~ oo), it can be shown that jN~ jc - 0 and jN' ~ jc' -
-y ~ w2 still hold for the case wa ~ 0.
It is clear that, whatevcr the weights the world planner attachcs to US
and European welfare (or whatever the relative bargaining strengths of the US
and Europe), the US fiscal stance is too loose and therefore policy coordina-
tion involves a reduction in the US deficit. It is not so clear what policy coordi-
nation implies for the European fiscal stance. lf the US has its way, interna-
tional policy coordination implies that Europe would expand. However, if
Europe has more barbaining strength, coordination implies that it would
reduce its public sector deficit.
So far it has bcen assumed that a US fiscal expansion is a be~ar-thy-
ncighbour policy (w8 ~ 0). If it is a locomotive polícy (ws ~ 0), a dominant
US (w -~ 0, y- 0) implies, as before, that the US fiscal stance is too loose
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(jn.' ~ jc' - 0) and the European fiscal is too tight (jN ~0 ~ jc) whilst a
dominant Europe (w -. ao, y' - 0) implies that the European fiscal stance is
too loose ( j,v ~ jc - 0) and the US fiscal stance is too tight (jN' ~ 0 ~ jc').
So far, the analysis considered bond-financed changes in the public
sector deficit. Now consider money-financed changes. For Europe this wil
not make much difference, because it is assumed that its economy is tully
indexed. For the US the government budget constraint, under money-finance
and nominal wage rigidity, can be written as
m' - exP(i~` -(m' - p')] - exp(f' -1- t' f~~n'), (6.16)
whcre f' includes interest payments on ihe government debt. Even if bond-
financed increases in the US deficit are a beggar-thy-neighbour policy (w2 ~ 0),
it may be, particularly at high rates of monetary growth, that money-financed
increases in the US deficit are a locomotive policy (if u~m' ~ w~. Hence, the
optimal US public sector deficits are, in the absence of international policy
coordination, more likely to be too tight when they are money-financed than
~vhen they are bond-financed.
VI1. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Empirical evidcnce shows that in the eighties US monetary policy has
bcen relatively tight, US fiseal policy has becn relativcly loose, and European
fiscal policy has been relatively tight. This period has also seen a huge rise in
Europcan unemployment. Econometric analysis shows that one cannot reject
the hypothesis of real wage rigidity for Germany, France, ltaly and Japan at
the 5 per cent significance level, but that Canada, the UK and the US do
display a significant degree of nominal wage rigidity in the short run. Incor-
poration of these stylistic facts in a two-country model with sluggish output
and labour markets, efficient and integrated financial goods shows that a US
monetary expansion and a European fiscal expansion are locomotive policies.
A US fiscal expansion is, typically, a beggar-thy-neighbour policy, because
thc negative effects of financial crowding out on European consumption and
inveslment are assumed to dominate the positive spill-over effects of US
activity on European exports. Also, an inerease in the real price oC oil, such
:is tlle OPEC oil shocks, Icads to a rise in the world real interest rate and,
typically, to a depreciation of the European real exchange rate. This means
that the adverse effccts on aggrcgate supply are attenuated in the US and
accentuated in Europe, so that an oil shock typically hits Europe much harder
than the US. It is not surprising that, in the absence of international policy
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coordination and in the aftermath of the OPEC oil shocks, the European
fiscal stance and US monetary growth have been too tight whilst the US fiscal
stance has been too loose. It is also clear that each of these three policies
have contributed to the recent rise in European unemployment.
The comparative statics results derived in this paper are sumtnarised
in Table 2.
TABLE 2
Summary of the EfTects of Hotne Shacks on Home Oulput (y), Foreil;n Output (y'), the
Hotne Real ExcttanYe Rate (c), and the Real lnterest Rate (r)
Section 4 Section S Section 6






f, t, -, f t. -, -, t t, t, -. i- t. ?, ?, -{-
-F, -, -F, - 0, 0, 0, 0 0, 0, 0, 0
t. -. i-, - t. i-. ~-, - t, -. -~. - ~-. t. t. -
f. t. f. -
Note : The effects of a home fiscal expansion in a NWR-RWR' world arc an appre-
ciation (deprecialion) of the hotne real exchan~e rete and a fall (incrcase) in foreign output
when the negative effect of fiaancial crowding out on forcign consumption and investment
dominate (are dominated by) the positive spill-over etlxts ot home activity on foreign ex-
ports, that is when ay~d exceeds (is less than) y.
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DATA APPENDIX
Standardised unemployment rates. Source : OECD Employment Outlook,
1986.
Deflator of consumers' expenditure, P~. Source : OECD National Accounts,
various issues.
InClation in the deflator of consumers' expenditure, dp~ where p~ - log (P~).
Long nominal interest rate, r~, generally the yield on long-term government
bonds. Source : IhiF International Financia! Statistica Ytarbook, 1983
and January l984.
Short nominal interest rate, r„ generally Central Bank's discount rate or a
treasury bill rate. Source : IMF International Financial Statistics Year-
book, 1983 and January 1984.
Realised short real interest rate, ., - ep~.
Real competitiveness, log(P,,,~P).
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Deflator of imports, P,„ - MC~JtQ where MC denotes imports at current
prices and DlQdenotes imports at 1980 prices. Source: DECD Nalional
Accounls, various issues.
Dcflator of value added, P- YC~YQ where YC denotes GDP at current
prices and YQ denotes GDP at 1980 prices. Source : OECD A'alioieal
Accounts, various issues.
Actual, structural and inflation-adjusted structural budget balances. Source :
~llullcr and Price, 1984, Tables A1.1 - A1.7 and A3.5.
Employers' tax rate, tl - EC~(!E-EC) where EC denotes employers' contri-
butions to social security and private pension schemes and IE denotes
income from employment. Source : OECD National Auounls, various
issues.
Employees' tax rate, ts - DT ~HCR where DT denotes direct taxes and em-
ployees' contributions to social security and HCR denotes households
current receipts. Source : OECD NationalAccounls, various issues.
Indirect tax rate, t~ -(TX - SI3)~YC where TX denotes indirect taxes and
SB denotes subsidies. Source : OECD National Auounts, various issues.
Import price component of the wedge, t,,,, defined as the share of imports in
final expenditures, hiC~(MC t YC), times log(P,,,~P).
Wedge, tl f tt f t~ t tm.
Nomínal wage, W, which is hourly earnings in manufacturing. Source :
OECD 111EI Hislorical Stalrslics, 1955-71 and 1960-79.
Wage inflation, Aw where w- log (W).
Real producers'wage, W(1 t tl)~P.
Real consumers' wage, W(1 - t~ ~P~.
Unemployment rate, u- UT ~ET where UT denotes total unemployment
and ET denotes total employment (including armed forces) Source :
OECD Labour Foru Slatislics, various issues.
Trend productivity of labour, PROD -'~s log(YF~ET) t l~,log(YF~ET)-1 t
i~, log(YF~ ET)~ where ?'F -(YC - TX ~- SB)YQ„~ YC denotes CDP
at factor cost and 1980 prices.
Measure of industrial conflicts, NC (see M. Paldam and Rasmussen, 1981,
"Data for Industrial Conflicts in 17 OECD countries, 1948-77", Arhus
University) Source : ILO Yearbook oj Labour Slatislics, various issues.
All thc data, except the structural budget balances, can be found in the
OECD databank of the Centre for Labour Economics (sce A. Newell, 1985,
"The Revised OECD Data Set", London School of Economics, Working
Paper No. 781, which includes D. Grubb, "The OECD Data Set").
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